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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
V.

ROBERT LEE HORNSBY,
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)
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NO. 47279-2019
BONNEVILLE COUNTY NO. CR-2018-7343

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Robert Lee Hornsby pied guilty to felony possession of a controlled substance. He was
sentenced to a unified term of five years, with two years fixed, and the court retained
jurisdiction. Mr. Hornsby argues that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence and retaining jurisdiction.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
At the end of July 2018, Mr. Hornsby was a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped by
the Idaho Falls Police "for not using a blinker." (R., pp.14-15; PSI, p.6.) Upon approaching the
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vehicle, the officers "could smell a strong odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle" and asked
all of the occupants to exit the vehicle. (R., p.15; PSI, p.6.) When Mr. Hornsby was searched, a
number of rolled up dollar bills were found in his pocket, along with another folded bill with a
"white powder" residue inside of it. (R., p.15; PSI, p.6.) After the residue tested presumptive
positive for cocaine, Mr. Hornsby was arrested. (R., p.15.)
After waiving his preliminary hearing, Mr. Hornsby was released "to the supervision of
Pretrial Services." (R., p.32 (Waiver of Preliminary Hearing); R., p.36 (Order for Release to PreTrial Services).) An Information was then filed, but Mr. Hornsby failed to appear for both his
initial and continued arraignments. (R., pp.39, 42, 56.) Mr. Hornsby was arraigned in February
2019. (R., p.64.)
The following month, Mr. Hornsby entered into a plea agreement with the State in which
he agreed to plead guilty to felony possession of a controlled substance, and the State agreed to
drop the charges of misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance and possession of
paraphernalia. (R., pp.76-79.) At the change of plea hearing, Mr. Hornsby admitted that he knew
the dollar bill contained cocaine. (Tr., p.11, Ls.18-23.) Mr. Hornsby was then sentenced at the
end of April. The State asked that Mr. Hornsby be given a "two to five underlying sentence with
the Court retaining Jurisdiction." 1 (Tr., p.22, Ls.16-17.) Mr. Hornsby's attorney asked that he be
given the same underlying sentence, but for that to be suspended and for him to be placed on
probation for four years. (Tr., p.23, Ls.17-19.) The Court then sentenced Mr. Hornsby to five
years, with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.104-05; Tr., p.27, L.24 - p.28,
L.12.)
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At the end of the sentencing hearing, the Court clarified that the Prosecutor was asking for the
underlying sentence to be five years, with two years fixed. (See Tr., p.30, L.16 - p.31, L.5.)
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Four days after he was sentenced, Mr. Hornsby's attorney filed a Rule 35 motion asking
that his sentence be reduced. (R., p.98.) The State opposed that Motion. (R., pp.111-12.) A
hearing was held and the Court orally denied the Rule 35 motion. (Tr., p.40, L.25 - p.41, L.2.) 2
Mr. Hornsby timely appealed from both the Judgment of Conviction and Order Retaining
Jurisdiction. (R., pp.114-16.)

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to place Mr. Hornsby on probation after
imposing a unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, following his plea of guilty to
felony possession of a controlled substance?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed to Place Mr. Hornsby On Probation
After Imposing A Unified Sentence Of Five Years, With Two Years Fixed, Following His Plea
Of Guilty To Felony Possession Of A Controlled Substance
Mr. Hornsby asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of five years,
with two years fixed, is excessive. He contends the district court failed to place him on probation
and denied his Rule 35 Motion without properly considering mitigating factors.

A.

Standard Of Review
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessive sentence, the

appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record, giving consideration to the
nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See

State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726 (2007); State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002); State v.
Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). "Once a criminal defendant's guilt has been established,
the trial judge is under a duty to tailor the sentence to the individual defendant." State v. Dallas,
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During the hearing, the Court "invite[ d] the State to prepare" an Order regarding the denial;
however, no Order is included in the Record or available on iCourt as of January 30, 2020.
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109 Idaho 670, 675 (1985). When a sentence is reviewed, the reviewing court will "consider the
defendant's entire sentence." State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726 (2007). However, the reviewing
court will "treat the minimum period specified by the sentencing judge as the probable duration
of confinement." State v. Phillips, 121 Idaho 261,262 (Ct. App. 1992).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "' [w ]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho
573 (1979)). Because Mr. Hornsby does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory
maximum, in order to show an abuse of discretion he must show that in light of the governing
criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. State v. Jackson, 130
Idaho 293, 294 (1997). In addition, "[t]he Legislature has explicitly provided that the decision
whether to retain jurisdiction ... is a matter of discretion." State v. Latneau, 154 Idaho 165, 166
(2013) (citing LC. § 19-2601(4)).
When this Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial court the
sequence of inquiry requires consideration of four essentials. Whether the trial
court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the
outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by
the exercise of reason.

Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018) (emphasis in original). However, "[ e]ven
where the district court appropriately understands its discretion and sentences a defendant
according to the applicable legal principles, an unreasonably excessive sentence can still be an
abuse of discretion, and this Court can reduce the sentence." State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 835
(2011).
In Idaho, "the primary objective of sentencing is protection of society" as well as the
"related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution." State v. Schiermeier, 165 Idaho 44 7,
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(2019). "A sentence of confinement fixed for longer than necessary to accomplish these purposes
is unreasonable." State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 284 (2003). "Moreover, it is clear, as a matter
of policy in Idaho, that the primary consideration is 'the good order and protection of society.'
All other factors must be subservient to that end." State v. Toohill, l 03 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App.
1982) (quoting State v. Moore, 78 Idaho 359, 363 (1956)).

B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Failing To Place Mr. Hornsby On Probation
And Denying His Rule 3 5 Motion
Mr. Hornsby alleges the district court imposed its sentence without properly considering

mitigating factors by not "[ acting] consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific
choices available to it," and by not "[reaching] its decision by the exercise of reason." My Fun

Life, 163 Idaho at 863. Deterrence to the individual is one of the four objectives governing
criminal punishment. Toohill, 103 Idaho at 568. But "[i]n fixing sentence, the trial court should
consider the previous character of the defendant, both good and bad." State v. Fuchs, 100 Idaho
341, 344 (1979).
Certain facts may be mitigating, even if they do not bear directly on the offense of
conviction. See State v. Caudill, l 09 Idaho 222, 224 (1985) ("The sentencing judge found several
mitigating factors, including Caudill's youthful age, prior nonviolent nature, lack of prior
criminal record, potential for rehabilitation, and remorse."). A defendant's lack of criminal intent
should also be considered. See State v. Mitchell, 77 Idaho 115, 118 (1955) (finding that it was
error for the trial court to fail to consider, inter alia, the fact that the defendant's involuntary
manslaughter (through a traffic accident) "did not involve criminal intent"). Family support may
also be a mitigating factor. State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982) (reducing sentence of
defendant who, inter alia, had the support of his family and his employer). In addition, a
sentencing court should consider a defendant's willingness and need to support a family. State v.
5

Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982) (reducing the sentence of a defendant, in part, because he "was
working and helping to support his children at the time of the conviction"). Finally, a defendant's
acceptance of responsibility for their actions, together with a need for and willingness to
participate in drug or alcohol rehabilitation should weigh in favor of the defendant. See Shideler,
103 Idaho at 595 (1982) (reducing indeterminate portion of sentence for robbery based on,
among other things, defendant's voluntary drug addiction rehabilitation and acceptance of
responsibility for his actions); State v. Coffin, 146 Idaho 166, 171 (Ct. App. 2008) (A
''willingness to seek treatment for an alcohol problem [was a ] mitigating circumstance[]" taken
into account by the court before finding that Coffin's sentence was not excessive) (internal
quotation marks removed).
Here, Mr. Hornsby was given a five-year sentence with two years fixed after pleading
guilty to possessing a dollar bill with cocaine residue. (See PSI, pp.6-7; R., p.104.) During both
the sentencing and Rule 35 hearings, the court discussed the presence of a number of mitigating
factors. As in Caudill, the court here found that Mr. Hornsby' s youthful age was a mitigating
factor. During sentencing, the court remarked that Mr. Hornsby was "a
And I have optimism that you'll do well." (Tr., p.27, Ls.22-23; see also Tr., p.33, Ls.20-25.)
The prosecutor also agreed that his age was a mitigating factor. (Tr., p.21, L.18.)
Mr. Hornsby has also acknowledged his crimes and showed remorse for them. During the
traffic stop, he immediately "admitted he had marijuana on his person." (R., p.15; PSI, p.6.)
During the Rule 35 hearing, he knew he had made a mistake and told the court "[he was] trying
to straighten up and do everything [he] can." (Tr., p.35, Ls.23-24.) He acknowledged that "he did
not put himself in a good position at sentencing" because "there may have been a
miscommunication with his prior attorney or a misunderstanding as to exactly what his duties
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were" in the presentence investigation process. (Tr., p.34, Ls.13-23.) He told the court, "I know
it look [sic] bad, but I'm not a bad person." (Tr., p.26, L.8.) The court seemed to understand this,
telling Mr. Hornsby, "I want to see you succeed." (Tr., p.27, L.9.)
Mr. Hornsby's actions have not been those of a hardened criminal. Before this offense, he
has never been charged with possession of any substance that would be a felony offense in
Idaho. (See PSI, pp.7-9.) Mr. Hornsby acknowledges he told the court he understood the
substance on the bill to be cocaine, and that the court found his plea "was made knowingly,
freely, and voluntarily." (Tr., p.11, Ls.18-23; p.12, Ls.10-11.)
Mr. Hornsby has the support of his family, and the need - and willingness - to support
his own family. His half-brother, Kwan Reeves, lives in the Idaho Falls area. (PSI, p.11.)
Mr. Hornsby moved to Idaho specifically "to stay with Kwan and his family." (PSI, p.11.) Kwan
told the presentence investigator that "he would like Mr. Hornsby to remain in the Idaho Falls
area, so [he] can provide support for the defendant." (PSI, p.12.) At the Rule 35 hearing,
Mr. Hornsby informed the court that he "found out that [he has] a baby on the way also. I got
[sic] a pregnant girlfriend." (Tr., p.35, Ls.19-20.) In order to support his growing family, he had
"lined up" jobs with two different roofing companies in the Idaho Falls area. (Tr., p.35, Ls.1118.) He also told the court he was "trying to get back into school." (Tr. p.35, L.21.) Accordingly,
Mr. Hornsby asserts that this shows his desire to establish strong ties to the community, the
support of his family, and his need and willingness to support his own growing family.
Mr. Hornsby also asserts that he can still be rehabilitated on probation. During the Rule
35 hearing, Mr. Hornsby discussed how, since sentencing, he had received "a letter from Grace
House confirming his application and conditional acceptance into their program," and funding
for a bed there, in order to get "the treatment that he needs to get done." (Tr., p.34, Ls.3-12.) The
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GAIN-I assessment done during the presentence investigation found that he needed "Level 2.1
Intensive Outpatient Treatment." (PSI, p.15.) This is precisely the type of program that Grace
House offers, and his application and acceptance into that program shows that rehabilitation is
both possible and likely if he were on probation.
During the Rule 35 hearing, the State declared that Mr. Hornsby had not presented any
new evidence in support of his motion. (Tr., p.37, Ls.12-18; R., p.112 (State's Opposition to
Rule 35).) The State said that the only new evidence was that he had applied to a problemsolving court and was denied. (Tr., p.37, Ls.12-17.; R., p.98 (Def Rule 35 Motion); see also
R., p.110 (Order Denying Admission to Felony Drug Court).) However, in addition to the
information about his drug court application, Mr. Hornsby discussed or presented a number of
new pieces of information and evidence to the court, including that he was an expecting father
(Tr., p.35, Ls.19-20), that he had two jobs lined up (Tr., p.35, Ls.11-18), and that he was trying
to get back into school (Tr., p.35, L.21). All of that was in addition to the evidence he presented
about his application and acceptance into the rehabilitation program at the Grace House. He
presented all of that information to the Court to show remorse and that he was "trying to
straighten up and do everything that [he could]" to show that he would be a good candidate for
probation. (Tr., p.35, Ls.23-24.) Nevertheless, the court still denied his Motion. (Tr., p.40, L.25 p.41, L.2.) Notably, the court did not deny the motion for a lack of new information, instead
acknowledging many of those things before denying the motion. (See Tr., p.39, L.21 - p.40,
L.24.) The court stated that it felt Mr. Hornsby would "be benefited by some of the programs that
[would] be available during the retained jurisdiction." (Tr., p.40, Ls.18-20.) Mr. Hornsby asserts
that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to consider the evidence he presented
showing that probation was appropriate in his case.
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Thus, Mr. Hornsby asserts he has presented mitigating evidence showing he would be an
appropriate candidate for probation and that the district court abused its discretion in twice
denying him that chance.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Hornsby respectfully requests that his case be remanded to the district court with
instructions that he is to be placed on probation.
DATED this 9th day of March, 2020.
/ s/ R. Jonathan Shirts
R. JONATHAN SHIRTS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 9th day of March, 2020, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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